Cassation
No. 103 of 2021 - Personal Status
Court
Panel: Chaired by Mr. Judge Falah Shaye’ Al-Hajri, Chief Judge of the
Circuit, accompanied by Messrs. Judges: Jum’a Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Otaibi
and Al-Tayeb Abdul Ghafour Abdul Wahab, serving as counsellors.
Traveling
with the Child in Custody:
-
Taking the child in custody outside the country requires the written approval of
the guardian. If the guardian refuses, the custodian can bring the matter to the
judge, who will assess the justifications for travel and the reasons behind the
guardian's objection. The forfeiture of the custodian's right is based on the
conflict of travel with the child's interests, not merely the act of traveling
itself.
Custody,
Its Nature, the Mother has the Priority to Take Care of her Child:
-
Custody involves the preservation, upbringing, and care of the child. The mother
has the first priority in caring for her child, and in emergencies, custody may
be transferred to the father. The determination of custody considers the child's
best interests, prioritising this over the order of individuals entitled to
custody.
Deficiencies
in Factual Reasoning:
-
An example of deficient reasoning is evident in obliging the appellant to return
his children from their original homeland in the State of Chad to the UAE
despite their settling down and enrollment in schools in their home
country.
In
accordance with the stipulations outlined in Islamic Sharia and the Personal
Status Law, the custodian is expressly prohibited from undertaking international
travel with the child without obtaining prior written consent from the guardian.
In the event that the guardian withholds consent, the matter may be escalated to
judicial review for evaluation. Furthermore, both during the course of matrimony
and the Iddah period following a revocable divorce, the mother is precluded from
relocating or traveling with the child outside the marital residence without the
explicit written authorisation of the father.
Subsequent
to a separation, the mother retains the prerogative to relocate within the
confines of the country with the child, provided that such a move does not
disrupt the child's upbringing, is not injurious to the father, and does not
impose an undue burden or extraordinary expenses on him for visitation. In cases
where the custodian is a party other than the mother, any travel with the child
necessitates written authorisation from the guardian. Similarly, the guardian,
whether the father or another individual, is proscribed from traveling with the
child during the custody period without obtaining the written consent of the
custodian.
It
is imperative to note that the forfeiture of custody for a divorced mother is
impermissible solely due to the father relocating to a different country. Such
forfeiture is only admissible if the relocation serves settlement purposes, is
non-detrimental to the mother, and the geographical distance between the two
countries hinders visitation and same-day return through regular means of
transportation, 1- in accordance with the Maliki and Hanafi schools of thought.
Islamic Sharia, in its benevolence, underscores the assignment of custody to
women over men as a manifestation of the mercy and compassion bestowed upon
women by the Creator for the welfare of their children. The paramount
consideration in all instances remains the best interest of the child in
custody.
The
provisions of Islamic Sharia firmly establish that custody is the inherent right
of the child over both parents, constituting a shared obligation as long as the
marital union persists. This underscores Islamic Sharia's progressive stance on
safeguarding, nurturing, and fostering the child in accordance with the
directives of the Creator, may His Glory be exalted, aiming for the child to
become a constructive member of society. Islam places considerable emphasis on
the family unit, encompassing all its members. In its earnest commitment to the
perpetuity and stability of the family structure, Islam has ingeniously devised
pre-emptive solutions and regulations to address anticipated issues, thereby
alleviating the burdens and mitigating the resultant effects. The Sharia's
concern for children is congruent with their educational and emotional
requirements, reflecting a holistic approach to their well-being.
The
legislation regarding child custody after divorce takes into account various
variables and specific circumstances, prioritizing the child's best interests,
life, and safety.
The
mother is considered more entitled to custody as an act of kindness and respect
for her, acknowledging her maternal affection if she is fit for custody. If an
emergency arises for her, then custody may be transferred to the father. This
approach aligns with the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, may God’s prayers
and peace be upon him, his family, and his companions (All of you are shepherds
and each is responsible for his flock, and the man is a shepherd of his family
and is responsible for his flock, and his saying, may God’s prayers and
peace be upon him, his family, and his companions. It is enough sin for a person
to lose those he supports and provides for).
The
evaluation of the child's best interest in custody is regarded as a factual
matter within the purview of the trial court, and it possesses the jurisdiction
to conduct such assessments without necessitating additional review, provided
that its decision is founded upon justifiable and substantial grounds.
Subsequently, the court is not compelled to align itself with the contentions
and arguments put forth by the opposing parties, so long as it elucidates the
legal principles underpinning its judgment and includes a refutation of any
conflicting assertions.
Given
the circumstances outlined, it is evident that the contested ruling failed to
take into consideration crucial factors, including the conditions of legal
relocation to the original country. The appellant's relocation, aimed at
settling and not detrimental to the mother, aligns with the legal requirements
for such moves. Moreover, the geographical distance between the two countries
impedes the appellant from visiting the child in custody and returning on the
same day through regular means of transportation. Contrary to the established
legal and material facts, the contested judgment erroneously compelled the
appellant to repatriate the children from their original homeland in Chad,
despite the prior agreement between the parties. This agreement, made in
consideration of the cancellation of the appellant's work-related activities due
to the COVID-19 pandemic, was contingent upon his impending move to the Republic
of Chad, where his residency is in the process of cancellation for permanent
return and relocation. The contested ruling lacks sufficient rationale and
deviates from the legal consequences of the relocation, which is substantiated
by written and judicial evidence. Notably, the relocation was for settlement
purposes and did not pose harm to the mother. The judgment, therefore, fails to
appropriately consider the established legal and factual circumstances
surrounding the appellant's relocation. Furthermore, the children have already
relocated to their homeland and seamlessly integrated into their schools and
familial environment, underscoring the impracticality of bringing them back to
the state. It is crucial to note that the repatriation is contingent upon social
and economic conditions and the approval of administrative authorities, aspects
that have not been substantiated to have been obtained subsequent to their
return and settlement in their original homeland. Regrettably, the contested
ruling failed to duly consider and examine this meritorious defence. This
oversight renders the ruling deficient in reasoning and constitutes a breach of
the right of defence. Also, the ruling relied on insufficient reasons that
lacked the requisite support. By failing to recognise this crucial aspect, the
ruling erred in comprehending the factual reality and assessing the evidence,
resulting in a violation of the tenets of the noble Islamic Sharia and the law.
Consequently, it is imperative that the ruling be reversed.
Whereas,
Article 13 of the Personal Status Law No. 28 of 2005 stipulates that if the
Court of Cassation reverses all or part of the contested ruling, it shall
adjudicate on the merits.
Whereas
in the facts of the case, the plaintiff-respondent initiated legal proceedings
against the appellant, seeking an order for the defendant to bring back the
children [Names] from their country in the State of Chad. The plaintiff argued
that the appellant, her husband, had caused her harm by returning the children
to their homeland without her proper authorisation, leading her to seek legal
intervention.
The
court of first instance, in a session on 27/7/2020, dismissed the case, citing
the plaintiff's acknowledgment that the defendant, who is the natural and legal
guardian, resides in Chad, his country of origin. The court found that the
relocation was for the purpose of settling down, and as a result, rejected the
plaintiff's claim.
Discontented
with this decision, the plaintiff appealed the ruling.
Subsequently,
in a session held on 11/1/2021, the Court of Appeal reversed the appealed
ruling, instructing the appellant to bring the children back from their country
in the State of Chad to the UAE.
In
response to this, the appellant filed an appeal in cassation against the
decision of the Court of Appeal. After presenting the cassation appeal to the
court convened in a Council Chamber, the panel deemed it valid for
consideration, and a session was scheduled to hear it, with both parties
notified of the proceedings.
The
appellant objects to the contested ruling, asserting that it violates the
provisions of Islamic Sharia and the law, breaches documented facts, and
contains flaws in inference. Specifically, the appellant takes issue with the
court's decision to compel him to bring the children back from Chad to the UAE,
despite having settled there and being enrolled in schools. The appellant argues
that there was a prior agreement with the respondent to return to their homeland
after the company's activity was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
asserting that his residency is under cancellation and an intention to relocate
permanently to Chad, which constitutes a meritorious defence that the trial
court did not address, leading to deficiencies in causation and a breach of the
right of defence, warranting a reversal of the ruling.
This
objection lacks merits, since in accordance with the stipulations outlined in
Islamic Sharia and the Personal Status Law, the custodian is expressly
prohibited from undertaking international travel with the child without
obtaining prior written consent from the guardian. In the event that the
guardian withholds consent, the matter may be escalated to judicial review for
evaluation. Furthermore, both during the course of matrimony and the Iddah
period following a revocable divorce, the mother is precluded from relocating or
traveling with the child outside the marital residence without the explicit
written authorisation of the father.
Subsequent
to a separation, the mother retains the prerogative to relocate within the
confines of the country with the child, provided that such a move does not
disrupt the child's upbringing, is not injurious to the father, and does not
impose an undue burden or extraordinary expenses on him for visitation. In cases
where the custodian is a party other than the mother, any travel with the child
necessitates written authorization from the guardian. Similarly, the guardian,
whether the father or another individual, is proscribed from traveling with the
child during the custody period without obtaining the written consent of the
custodian.
It
is imperative to note that the forfeiture of custody for a divorced mother is
impermissible solely due to the father relocating to a different country. Such
forfeiture is only admissible if the relocation serves settlement purposes, is
non-detrimental to the mother, and the geographical distance between the two
countries hinders visitation and same-day return through regular means of
transportation,
in
accordance with the Maliki and Hanafi schools of thought. Islamic Sharia, in its
benevolence, underscores the assignment of custody to women over men as a
manifestation of the mercy and compassion bestowed upon women by the Creator for
the welfare of their children. The paramount consideration in all instances
remains the best interest of the child in custody.
The
provisions of Islamic Sharia firmly establish that custody is the inherent right
of the child over both parents, constituting a shared obligation as long as the
marital union persists. This underscores Islamic Sharia's progressive stance on
safeguarding, nurturing, and fostering the child in accordance with the
directives of the Creator, may His Glory be exalted, aiming for the child to
become a constructive member of society. Islam places considerable emphasis on
the family unit, encompassing all its members. In its earnest commitment to the
perpetuity and stability of the family structure, Islam has ingeniously devised
pre-emptive solutions and regulations to address anticipated issues, thereby
alleviating the burdens and mitigating the resultant effects. The Sharia's
concern for children is congruent with their educational and emotional
requirements, reflecting a holistic approach to their well-being.
The
legislation regarding child custody after divorce takes into account various
variables and specific circumstances, prioritizing the child's best interests,
life, and safety.
The
mother is considered more entitled to custody as an act of kindness and respect
for her, acknowledging her maternal affection if she is fit for custody. If an
emergency arises for her, then custody may be transferred to the father. This
approach aligns with the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, may God’s prayers
and peace be upon him, his family, and his companions (All of you are shepherds
and each is responsible for his flock, and the man is a shepherd of his family
and is responsible for his flock, and his saying, may God’s prayers and
peace be upon him, his family, and his companions. It is enough sin for a person
to lose those he supports and provides for).
The
evaluation of the child's best interest in custody is regarded as a factual
matter within the purview of the trial court, and it possesses the jurisdiction
to conduct such assessments without necessitating additional review, provided
that its decision is founded upon justifiable and substantial grounds.
Subsequently, the court is not compelled to align itself with the contentions
and arguments put forth by the opposing parties, so long as it elucidates the
legal principles underpinning its judgment and includes a refutation of any
conflicting assertions.
Given
the circumstances outlined, it is evident that the contested ruling failed to
take into consideration crucial factors, including the conditions of legal
relocation to the original country. The appellant's relocation, aimed at
settling and not detrimental to the mother, aligns with the legal requirements
for such moves. Moreover, the geographical distance between the two countries
impedes the appellant from visiting the child in custody and returning on the
same day through regular means of transportation. Contrary to the established
legal and material facts, the contested judgment erroneously compelled the
appellant to repatriate the children from their original homeland in Chad,
despite the prior agreement between the parties. This agreement, made in
consideration of the cancellation of the appellant's work-related activities due
to the COVID-19 pandemic, was contingent upon his impending move to the Republic
of Chad, where his residency is in the process of cancellation for permanent
return and relocation. The contested ruling lacks sufficient rationale and
deviates from the legal consequences of the relocation, which is substantiated
by written and judicial evidence. Notably, the relocation was for settlement
purposes and did not pose harm to the mother. The judgment, therefore, fails to
appropriately consider the established legal and factual circumstances
surrounding the appellant's relocation. Furthermore, the children have already
relocated to their homeland and seamlessly integrated into their schools and
familial environment, underscoring the impracticality of bringing them back to
the state. It is crucial to note that the repatriation is contingent upon social
and economic conditions and the approval of administrative authorities, aspects
that have not been substantiated to have been obtained subsequent to their
return and settlement in their original homeland. Regrettably, the contested
ruling failed to duly consider and examine this meritorious defence. This
oversight renders the ruling deficient in reasoning and constitutes a breach of
the right of defence. Also, the ruling relied on insufficient reasons that
lacked the requisite support. By failing to recognise this crucial aspect, the
ruling erred in comprehending the factual reality and assessing the evidence,
resulting in a violation of the tenets of the noble Islamic Sharia and the law.
Consequently, it is imperative that the ruling be reversed with an unequivocal
adjudication.
Whereas,
Article 13 of the Personal Status Law No. 28 of 2005 stipulates that if the
Court of Cassation reverses all or part of the contested ruling, it shall
adjudicate on the merits.